0115 - Patterns
Relationship to Dissociated States and Self-identity
The integration of thoughtforms into psychological theory raises profound and complex questions concerning the relationship between self-identity and consciousness. The self is usually considered to be malleable and dependent on social context. For psychologist-philosopher William James, ‘A man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him’.
Moreover, in recent research with immersive virtual reality equipment, virtual selves have been created whose identity can be manipulated and which visually appear to be located exterior to the person’s own body. A leading proponent of this research, philosopher Thomas Metzner, concludes that the self is merely a model or construct which is created by the brain and disappears when not needed, as is clearly demonstrated when we daydream.28
The study of psychiatric patients demonstrating possession states led Alan Crabtree to a yet more radical conclusion, that the personality of a normal well-functioning individual in fact consists of sub-personalities organized by an executive or operant self. Where dissociated states occur, the individual’s memory has become fragmented among the sub-personalities, each of which has developed its own conscious state associated with this memory.
Thoughtforms would occur if these entities become exteriorized and if the dissociation is experienced as being externally enforced, in which case the condition becomes one of possession. A similar, somewhat more elaborate theory developed by Stanley Krippner takes into account the degree of integration versus dissociation and the degree of control versus flow.29
Crabtree and Krippner differ radically from conventional philosophers and neuroscientists in accepting psi phenomena as an expression of the essential connectedness of consciousness – a form of panpsychism or extended consciousness. Crabtree considers also the possibility of hierarchical selves, built around a supraliminal self or core consciousness, that can reincarnate and on occasion be infiltrated by memories of its former lives - or even the former lives of others.
Source: https://psi-encyclopedia.spr.ac.uk/articles/thoughtforms
The philosophical literature on multiple personality has focused primarily on problems about personal identity and psychological explanation. But multiple personality and other dissociative phenomena raise equally important and even more urgent questions about moral responsibility, in particular: In what respect(s) and to what extent should a multiple be held responsible for the actions of his/her alternate personalities? Cases of dreaming help illustrate why attributions of responsibility in cases of dissociation do not turn on putative changes in identity, as some have supposed. Instead, it is argued that traditional criteria of rationality and behavioral control apply also to cases of dissociation.
It is noted, however, that one can distinguish different kinds of responsibility in cases of dissociation, and that one is responsible for one's dreams in a different sense from that in which one is responsible for actions one can control and evaluate. It is also argued that in cases of multiple personality it is important to distinguish control over switching of personalities from an alter's control over its own behavior. Moreover, the author considers reasons for thinking that amnesia is less relevant to attributions of responsibility than many have supposed.