The idea of this article came from a comment by a friend of mine. The gist of the comment, or reflecion, was something to the effect: How can we study such an elusive and strange phenomenon as UFOs/UAP with the scientific method? My interpretation of the comment is that my friend implicitly referred to the high strangeness aspect of the UFO phenomenon (-na). In other words, my friend wondered how the metaphysical assumptions (for instance, “physicalism”) of contemporary science can even start to take seriously phenomena that seem to contradict our concepts of what is real or not, possible or impossible. (The terms “metaphysics” and “physicalism” will be defined after this introduction in sections 1 and 2).

I use the term “high strangeness” in J. Allen Hynek´s (1910–1986) meaning as a qualitative measure of the plausibility of a UFO sighting/case (roughly, “the more bizarre and absurd, the more plausible”). But I am using the term high strangeness in a broader sense, including phenomena manifesting at Skinwalker Ranch, Marley Woods, and similar places worldwide. Thus, high strangeness experiences and events can occur independently of a UFO presence (which do not rule the possibility that they all are connected in one way or another).

Since I have a background in philosophy (I´m not a professional philosopher), my friend´s comment made me think about why the high strangeness aspect of the UFO phenomenon seems to keep most (not all) scientists away from seriously studying it (besides the social stigma, fear of losing financial support, etc.).

More specifically, the comment made me wonder about the following question:

• Is there any metaphysical reason that justifies science to reject to seriously study the high strangeness aspect of the UFO phenomenon (-na)?

Keep that question in mind because it is the main and underlying theme we will explore in this article. Henceforth I will refer to the main and underlying theme as “The Metaphysical Question”, abbreviated to “TMQ”. Also, remember that since TMQ is a metaphysical question, we will explore it on an abstract and general level, not on an empirical level. There is no evidence of any kind provided in this article or definitive answers to the questions raised. Hopefully, some of the content is thought-provoking.

After this introduction, I will overview some metaphysical issues in contemporary (Western) philosophy and science, which I think are relevant to the high strangeness aspect. The purpose of the overview is to explore TMQ and to demonstrate that some basic knowledge about metaphysics — a branch of philosophy — can be relevant to your studies of the high strangeness aspect and/or UFOs. 

The structure of the content coming after this introduction is as follows.

• Section 1 will define “metaphysics” and mention some of its subject matters.

• In section 2 comes an overview of the most common metaphysical assumption in modern science, namely, “physicalism” (also known as “materialism”). In the same section, I will contrast physicalism with the metaphysical notion of dualism and also present two objections to physicalism. The general idea with section 2 (and its subsections) is to explore whether there is any metaphysical/logical reason for science to dismiss the high strangeness aspect of UFOs/UAP (that is, to explore TMQ).

• Finally, in section 3, I will summarize the most important points in the previous sections, discuss their relevance to the study of high strangeness events and/or UFOs, and answer the main and underlying question we have explored.

As just mentioned, I will expand on “why care about metaphysics?” in section 3. Yet, it may be appropriate to briefly address the question at this point: I believe some degree of awareness of your own and other´s metaphysical assumptions about reality can facilitate an approach of curiosity (which for me is related to “playfulness”) rather than a narrow-minded one. In the best case, curiosity and awareness can lead to intriguing and constructive conversations where both sides learn something new and walk away from the conversation or even a debate feeling respected, regardless of agreeing or disagreeing. Hopefully, if you read this article in full, the answer to why will become clearer (particularly if you read my answer in section 3). And if your answer turns out that you do not care, well, at least, you will know that.

Let me round off this introduction by saying that we should not forget that in the history of ufology (and of paranormal research), there have been scientists — there still are — who have lived up to the ideal of the scientific approach: to be curious about the world, to have the courage to look at anomalies, and have the integrity and humility to consider facts that go against dearly held assumptions among peers.

The most recent and talked-about example is Professor Avi Loeb and his colleagues at The Galileo Project. Even though I feel encouraged by Professor Loeb´s project and believe some fruitful results can come out of it, the project is still predicated on physicalism. And as we will see in section 2, physicalism has its constraints in explaining the high strangeness of the UFO phenomenon. Of course, The Galileo Project is not focused on the high strangeness aspect, so it can still yield interesting results of UFOs’ physical and technological aspects. (Who knows; maybe also of the high strangeness aspect?).

Nonetheless, my point is that those potential results and insights will paint an incomplete picture of the nature of the UFO phenomenon and, at the end of the day, the nature of reality.

Lastly, and most importantly, I am not against physicalism per se or science in general. I am against narrow-mindedness and unwillingness to question one´s own dearly held assumptions about the world, other people, and so on. So this article is not an attempt to disparage science in general or some particular scientist or debunker. Instead, it is a homage to everyone who has the courage to question their own assumptions and who is willing to endure doubt and uncertainty.

Let us now turn to what the word metaphysics means and what some of its subject matters are.

Contemporary metaphysics is tricky to define. It is usually categorized as a branch of philosophy that studies “the ultimate reality”. Roughly, metaphysics seeks to answer questions about the existence, nature, and interrelations of different kinds of entities — that is, of existents or things in the broadest sense of the term. It is usually understood as working at an abstract and general level: it is not concerned with concrete individual things or particular relations but rather with kinds of things and kinds of relations.

It may help with some historical context to better understand the nature and scope of today´s metaphysics. The word “metaphysics” is derived from a collective title of the fourteen books by Aristotle (4th century BCE) that we currently consider making up his Metaphysics. But Aristotle himself did not use the word “metaphysics”. Aristotle called the branch of philosophy in his fourteen books for “first philosophy”, “first science”, “wisdom”, and “theology”.

In the 1st century BCE, an editor of Aristotle´s works gave the fourteen books the title “Ta meta ta physika”, which means, roughly, “the ones [i.e., books] after the ones about nature.” So “metaphysics” do not mean something transcendent or beyond physics/science, but rather the point with the editor´s title “Ta meta ta physica” was probably a warning to students to first master the subject matter of the natural world and changing things (“physics”) before studying Aristotle´s “first philosophy” about things that do not change (metaphysics).

Very roughly, then, from Aristotle until the seventeenth century, the subject matters of metaphysics were:

• “being as such” (i.e., the nature of being, or what it is for a thing to be or to exist).

• “the first causes of things” (i.e., their original or primary causes).

• “that which does not change”.

While it is true that all the problems that Aristotle considered in his fourteen books are still said to belong to metaphysics, since at least the 17th century, the word metaphysics has been applied to a much wider range of subjects matters. In contemporary metaphysics, subject matters as, for example, the mind-body problem, identity (especially “numerical identity”), modality (about possibility and necessity), free will, and many more are included.

For the interested reader, I can recommend the following sources for a more detailed overview of the issues debated in today´s version of metaphysics:

• https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/

• https://www.britannica.com/topic/metaphysics/Problems-in-metaphysics#ref344386

I have used those two sources in what I have just said about the historical context, and I will continue to use them in the remaining sections. Even though I am not referencing them directly in the text, you know where to check whether my interpretation of various concepts is correct and compare the above sources (always a good idea) with other sources.

The remaining sections and their subsections (headlines in italics) constitute the main content of this article. It is below our exploration of TMQ, really takes off. Section 2. “Physicalism and Dualism”, begins with some important caveats and clarifications, so I would appreciate it if you read them and keep them in mind.

Throughout, my intention is not to decry science in general or some scientists and/or debunkers in particular. My intention is to present material to the reader so that they can explore and make up their own mind about the main and underlying question in section 2 and its subsections:

• 1. The Metaphysical Question (TMQ). Is there any metaphysical reason that justifies science to reject to seriously study the high strangeness aspect of the UFO phenomenon (-na)?

Furthermore, I will generalize what I think is the most prominent metaphysical assumption in the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) and the social sciences. However, when I use the terms “science” and “scientist”, I am mainly referring to the natural sciences (including neuroscience).

My generalization is that science is based on the metaphysical assumption called physicalism. Henceforth I will equate physicalism with materialism. The former is a more recent term for the latter (there are historical differences, but they are not relevant for our purposes).

The structure of section 2 is that we will start with physicalism in general, then look at supervenience physicalism, and end section 2 with two objections to (supervenience) physicalism, namely, necessitation dualism and the notion of qualia (or the knowledge argument).

Most importantly, the content in the remaining sections and subsections is very simplified. In an academic context, my overview would not pass the test of specificity, precision, clarity, and so on. In other words, my overview is not a true reflection of the complexity and subtlety inherent in the subject matters covered below. On the other hand, the purpose of the overview is to give you a rough idea of what metaphysics is and how it can be relevant to studies of high strangeness experiences and UFOs/UAP. Though simplified, I hope the complexity of the metaphysical issues covered by the overview will shine through a little.

What is physicalism?

Let us start by looking into the general version of physicalism. In its slogan form, physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. The general idea is that the universe (or “nature” or the “natural world”) and everything in it (atoms, chairs, planets, thoughts, sensations, etc.) conforms to a certain condition: the condition of being physical. A physicalist will not deny that there are items or phenomena in the actual world that do not appear physical: items or phenomena of social, psychological, moral, or mathematical nature. Nevertheless, a physicalist will insist that at the end of the day, such items and phenomena are physical or, at a minimum, bear an important relation to the physical.

There are several versions of physicalism and several arguments for or against the soundness of each of the versions of physicalism. But for the sake of clarity, I will attend to one version of physicalism. Before we look at that version in the next subsection, consider these two distinct but related questions you can ask about physicalism:

1. The interpretation question: What does it mean to say everything is physical?

2. The truth question: Is it true to say that everything is physical?

You can think of the interpretation question asking both a) what is the condition, being physical, that everything satisfies or bear a relation to, and b) what relation or relations obtain between everything and the physical, if physicalism is true. That is, b) is asking; in what sense is physicalism a complete thesis, a thesis that applies to everything whatsoever.

The questions are distinct — 1. and 2., and a) and b) — but also related since you need to first have an answer to 1. and a) before you really can answer 2. and b). In other words, the answer to if physicalism is true presupposes that we can say something about what it is for a thing/phenomenon to be physical.

Can we say that the fuzzy and probabilistic electrons on a quantum level are physical? Or that relations and states on the quantum level are physical? Are abstract items like numbers physical; do they exist in an objective meaning? And what is the distinction between subjective and objective and abstract and concrete?

Believe it or not, physicists disagree on whether electrons on a quantum level are physical or not. At least the more philosophically minded physicists. I would guess (I may be terribly mistaken) that most physicists either do not have time to ponder metaphysical questions or find such questions meaningless in the first place. To be fair, some philosophers would agree: a highly influential philosopher who found metaphysics an impossible or meaningless endeavor was Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000).

Nonetheless, I think that you cannot determine the truth or completeness of physicalism if you cannot answer what the condition, being physical, is. Many in the ufo community are interested in, what I call, the consciousness aspect of the UFO phenomenon (the high strangeness aspect, or the psychic aspect). To a large degree, most people interested in the consciousness aspect subscribe implicitly to the metaphysical thesis of dualism.

Dualism as physicalism comes in many versions. So very simplified, I will refer to dualism as the metaphysical assumption that “mind” (subjective experiences/consciousness) and “matter” (physical objects like brains) are distinct or even wholly separate. How? Well, it depends on what version of dualism we are referring to; substance dualism, property dualism, or necessitation dualism.

Throughout, I will stick to necessitation dualism (which is presented after the subsection “Supervenience physicalism”) and contrast it to a version of physicalism: supervenience physicalism (explained below). The point is to present a small selection of the different arguments for or against physicalism and dualism. Hopefully, that selection will be enough to show that in metaphysics, the question of whether physicalism is an adequate thesis about reality is far from settled (which does not imply that dualism is a more adequate framework for understanding reality).

And in the last subsection of section 2, we will examine the second objection (the first objection being necessitation dualism) to supervenience physicalism: the notion of qualia. (That is, those are the objections this overview covers. There are many other objections to both physicalism and dualism in the literature). But before all that, supervenience physicalism.

Supervenience physicalism

In the following, we will approach the completeness question (question b) above) — is physicalism a complete thesis? — by contrasting supervenience physicalism to necessitation dualism (the latter is covered in the next subsection). In our context, “necessity” is a modal notion connected to possibility and necessity, to what might or must be the case. But let us first turn to the concept of “supervenience”.

The term “supervenience” is, in our context, a purely philosophical concept. Do not worry if you feel you don´t understand what kind of relation supervenience is or how it is supposed to work. I have studied philosophy relatively extensive at university (Lund University, Sweden) and private, but I am still unsure how to exactly understand supervenience. Just try to get an intuitive grasp on what supervenience physicalism would say about the possibility or impossibility of the high strangeness aspect.

In its slogan form, supervenience says that “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”. Let me borrow an example from philosopher David Lewis (1941–2001) for an approximate idea of what supervenience is:

A dot-matrix picture has global properties — it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot — and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn’t a dot. (Lewis, 1986, p. 14, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.)

Lewis claims that the “global properties” — for example, subjective experiences — must be the same as, or at least have a close and certain relation to, the “dots and non-dots” — for example, the laws of physics. So the basic idea of supervenience is that the world’s physical properties are like the dots in the picture, and the psychological, biological, or social properties of the world are like the global properties of the picture. Just as the global properties of the picture supervene on the dots, so too everything in our world supervenes on the physical, if physicalism is true. [Note: From now on, I am not referring specifically to Lewis´notion of supervenience or physicalism].

So supervenience is the necessary relation between everything in the universe and the physical. According to supervenience physicalism, it must be the case that everything in the world supervenes on the physical. You can think about the “global properties” and the “dots and non-dots” as different levels, or a hierarchy. Then, the physical properties of the world (atoms, neurons, etc.) are the base of the hierarchy, and the non-physical properties are higher up in the hierarchy (consciousness at the top of the hierarchy).

That means that the necessary relation, supervenience, is a kind of asymmetric dependence between two levels of property, such that a “lower” level determines a “higher” level. According to supervenience physicalism, the physical properties determine the non-physical properties, but not the other way around: individual neurons do not possess mental characteristics, computer circuits do not possess computational properties, and so on.

Now, I assume that metaphysical possibility is the same as logical possibility (this is a fairly but not a totally uncontroversial assumption). If that is the case, we can express supervenience physicalism more technically:

• 1. There is no possible world that is identical to our world in every physical respect but which is not identical to it in a biological or social or psychological respect.

The above statement is supervenience physicalism´s answer to the completeness question: what relation (or dependence) obtain between everything and the physical, if physicalism is true? Put in another way, if you had a physical “copy” of yourself on a possible world, your physical copy must be identical to who you are in this actual world (that is, your physical copy must have the same subjective experience of what it is like being you, if physicalism is true).

You can think of supervenience physicalism as a reductionist notion. That is, the notion that you can reduce all human experiences — the smell of coffee, mystical experiences, etc. — to a description in neuroscientific terms and, perhaps, quantum mechanical terms.

[Note: Technically, supervenience and reduction are distinct notions. You can also say that matter entails the mind or that the mind is grounded in matter, but I will not go into those distinctions here. The distinctions have to do with the degree of modal force: the strength of the relation that obtains between everything and the physical].

Now, it sounds rather convincing that everything in the universe supervenes on the physical. Supervenience physicalism is an attractively parsimonious thesis of reality. But should we accept its conclusion?

Probably not, for the simple reason that science cannot answer the condition question (question a) above): what is the condition, being physical, that everything satisfies or bear a relation to? That is probably the more important question to understand than the completeness question (we will explore the condition question in the subsection “Notion of qualia…”). In philosophy and science, it is the completeness question that, so far, has got most of the attention.

However, the condition question is just as central and relevant to the study of the high strangeness aspect: what is the nature of the source (s) causing high strangeness experiences/events? Is it physical, non-physical, or both? Or, what is the nature of consciousness? Is it reducible to the physical, or is it more fundamental than the physical (that is, that consciousness determines “matter”, and is further down the base of the “hierarchy” than the natural sciences)? If the latter, then we really have reason to study the question; what is the condition, being physical, that everything bears a relation to?

If you want to read a more detailed entry on what supervenience is, the following is a good entry:

• 1. https://iep.utm.edu/superven/

Let us continue exploring our underlying question — is there any metaphysical reason that justifies science to reject to seriously study the high strangeness aspect of the UFO phenomenon? — by looking at a couple of objections to (supervenience) physicalism. We will start with a version of dualism.

Objections to physicalism: Necessitation dualism

So what objections are there to the general account of supervenience physicalism (henceforth, “SP”)? There are many objections, but I will limit them to two: necessitation dualism and the notion of qualia (“the felt qualities of experiences”). Let us begin with the challenge from necessitation dualism (henceforth “ND”).

First, recall that SP expresses a necessary condition for physicalism, but it does not provide a sufficient condition; in other words, SP is not a complete thesis. The underlying rationale is that, intuitively, one thing can supervene on another and yet be of a completely different nature. This objection is sometimes called the sufficiency problem.

One may further discuss this objection by considering positions in philosophy that entail supervenience and yet deny physicalism. One such position is necessitation dualism (ND).

ND brings together elements of both physicalism and its traditional rival, dualism. On the one hand, the necessitation dualist (NDst) says that mental facts (subjective experiences) and physical facts are metaphysically distinct, just as a standard dualist does. On the other hand, the NDst wants to agree with the physicalist that mental facts are necessitated by, and supervene on, the physical facts.

If ND is a coherent position, SP does not express a sufficient condition for physicalism. If ND is true, any physical duplicate (possible world) of the actual world is a duplicate simply and unconditionally (or simpliciter). And yet, if dualism of any version is true, including ND, physicalism is false. Because, if ND is true, there is some property distinct from the physical that is “transferred” or “copied” from our actual world to the possible world (physical duplicate).

According to ND, physical information is not the whole story, and two physically identical worlds can differ in non-physical respects. In contrast to David Lewis´ concept of supervenience, ND says that even if the “dots and non-dots” are identical in two worlds, these worlds can still differ in their respective “global properties”. That is, a possible world that in every respect is physically identical to our actual world can still differ in psychological, biological, or social respects.

[Note: Here, you can ponder if the placebo effect or the high strangeness aspect are indicative of ND being a more complete thesis than physicalism? Or, perhaps, SP and ND are not mutually exclusive?].

So, ND leaves open the metaphysical possibility that two physically identical beings can differ mentally (for instance, it opens up the possibility of the philosophical notion of a “zombie”). For example, one version of dualism, property dualism, leave open the metaphysical possibility that mental facts/properties are non-physical (the so-called double-aspect theory of Benedict de Spinoza (1632–77) can be thought of as a form of property dualism) and, if I understand it correctly, that the non-physical properties are causally efficacious.

But how to understand ND? How can mental facts and physical facts simultaneously be both distinct/wholly separate and yet have a necessary relation? ND can be developed into a property dualism and, then, claim that (i) every particular is a physical particular but (ii) some particulars (like human beings) have psychological properties wholly distinct from any physical properties.

The most common objection to (i) and (ii) is that of causation. If you are a believer in psychic phenomena and a dualist, you have to come up with an explanation of how the human mind — which, according to ND, is distinct or even wholly separate from “matter” — can influence physical particulars.

However, as I understand it, the high strangeness aspect per se is not inconsistent with physicalism. Rather the debate on whether, for instance, paranormal phenomena are possible or impossible comes down to the question of the nature of the physical; in other words, what is it for something to be physical? Because on a quantum level, we can legitimately ask if the objects we are studying are “objects” in an everyday sense or they are theory-based conceptions.

Science is, in many ways, amazing, but it is silent about the nature of the physical. What we normally assume as being physical might turn out to be something essentially or fundamentally different — conscious or mental, in some sense and to some degree. I am not claiming that is the case. My claim is that as long as science does not understand the fundamental nature of reality, various possibilities about what might or must be the case should be open for serious inquiry.

[Note: A neuroscientific theory about consciousness, Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which main focus is on “being” rather than “doing”/function, is interesting and relevant for our metaphysical discussion. I have written about IIT here].

Nonetheless, depending on how you articulate dualism, you can commit yourself to contradict the known laws of physics, such as the conservation laws. That is not a trivial challenge for dualism, but we will not solve that problem here and now.

Instead, let us turn to the other objection to SP, namely, the notion of qualia.

The notion of qualia/The knowledge argument

So far, we have mostly examined the completeness question (question b) above). But in this section, we will focus on an objection to (supervenience) physicalism that goes to the heart of the condition question: what is the condition of being physical (question a) above)? And it is the notion of qualia — subjective experiences of “redness”, the smell of chocolate, and so on — that underlies the objection called the knowledge argument.

The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious/subjective experience involves non-physical properties. It rests on the intuition that someone who has complete physical information about another conscious being might yet lack information about how it feels to have the experiences of that being. The knowledge argument is one of the main challenges to physicalism.

It was the philosopher Frank Jackson who in the early 1980s popularized the knowledge argument, but there are numerous precursors of the argument in the literature (for example, C.D. Broad´s “Archangel” (1925) and Thomas Nagel´s “What is it like to be a bat?” (1974)).

Jackson came up with a much-cited thought experiment in his paper, “Epiphenomenal Qualia” in The Philosophical Quarterly (1982), vol. 32, no.127, pp. 127–136. (doi:10.2307/2960077). Jackson´s paper (1982) has two thought experiments, but we will examine the most well-known and much-cited. It involves Mary, a super scientist living under special conditions:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on (Jackson, 1982, p. 130).

So Mary has all the physical information there is to have about human visual perception. But due to her special living conditions, Mary´s eyes have only been exposed to visual stimuli in black and white.

The thought experiment continues with Mary being released (thank god!) from her black and white world to the ordinary world. Jackson asks, will Mary learn anything or not? That is, is she learning or not something about how it is like to experience colors? Will she learn anything that she could not experience in her black and white world? Think about the answer before reading on (given my presentation of the problem is clear).

According to Jackson, “it seems just obvious that she [Mary] will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it” (Jackson, 1982, p. 30). But that seems like a problem for physicalism. If all the information there is to have is physical, how can Mary learn something about qualia (non-physical information) after being released? Jackson´s argument is somewhat more subtle than I am portraying here, likewise the responses to the knowledge argument. Still, for our purposes, it is enough for us to understand Jackson´s conclusion:

The conclusion in each case [vision, hearing, mental states, etc.] is that the qualia are left out of the physicalist story. And the polemical strength of the Knowledge argument is that it is so hard to deny the central claim that one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have (Jackson, 1982, p. 130).

So the nub of Jackson´s argument is that there is information about the world — qualia; in Mary´s case, the subjective experience of colors — that physicalism cannot capture. After her release, Mary learned something (new) about the world: what it is like to experience color. But if physicalism is true, Mary would have had the phenomenal information (color qualia) before she was released. But she has not, according to Jackson´s knowledge argument. Intuitively, Jackson´s conclusion seems convincing: Mary learns to experience color qualia; therefore, physicalism is false.

However, in the late 1990s, Jackson rejected the knowledge argument and embraced physicalism. Specifically, he rejected that Mary learns something new when she leaves the black and white room. Nevertheless, the debate over whether the knowledge argument is a valid objection to physicalism is very much alive and vital in various branches of philosophy.

For the reader who wants to know more about the knowledge argument and overview the arguments for and against it, this is a good entry:

• 1. https://iep.utm.edu/know-arg/

So we have arrived at the last and final section of this article (puh… finally…). In section 3, I will summarize the main points in previous sections and discuss their relevance to the study of high strangeness experiences and UFOs/UAP. Also, I will give my own answer to the underlying question we have explored in the previous sections, TMQ.

The general idea with the overview has been to explore, from a metaphysical perspective, whether physicalism is a sufficient reason for science to reject the high strangeness aspect of UFOs/UAP. I will, in a moment, share my own answer to TMQ, but it is really up to you to come up with an answer and your justifications for it.

But perhaps the main purpose of the overview has been to give you a rough idea of what metaphysics, as a branch of philosophy, is or, at least, a few parts of metaphysics. So why care about metaphysics?

I briefly answered that question in the introduction, and I will repeat it here, albeit in a slightly different way: Every human being has metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality, time, causation, what is possible or impossible, and so on. Those metaphysical assumptions have a strong influence on our worldview in general and even on more particular topics such as economics or history (“the invisible hand” or “historical materialism”). Since our metaphysical assumptions are usually implicit, unarticulated, and can drive us to torture and kill each other (the “Holy Inquisition”), I think making them explicit and articulated is essential. That is why I, in the introduction, said that a greater awareness of your own metaphysical assumptions can facilitate an approach of open-mindedness and curiosity rather than a narrow-minded one.

One last thing on why care about metaphysics before moving on to my answer to TMQ. Some basic knowledge and awareness of metaphysical subject matters can, and should, make us realize how little we know about topics we take for granted that we understand what they are and how they work. That realization, in turn, should make us humble and wiser. I hope my answer to “why metaphysics?” is clear enough, and if so, it is still ok to disagree.

So let us turn to my own answer to TMQ. My own assumption in the overview has been that the main reason for the rejection of the high strangeness aspect among some scientists is that they operate on the metaphysical assumption called physicalism. Furthermore, my argument has been that physicalism may sometimes function as a value judgment about what knowledge is worth acquiring and how, rather than an empirical judgment.

Based on those assumptions, my own answer to TMQ — Is there any metaphysical reason that justifies science to reject to seriously study the high strangeness aspect of the UFO phenomenon (-na)? — is no.

For the simple reason, that science is silent about the condition question: what is the condition, being physical, that everything satisfies or bears a relation to? So, what are the implications? A metaphysical implication is that physicalism cannot be considered a complete thesis about the nature of reality. In my world, the incompleteness of physicalism should, at least, leave open the possibility that manifestations of high strangeness might represent something real and scientifically significant.

Of course, many people, including myself, have experienced and know that high strangeness events occur in everyday reality. But that is not my point: I am not questioning that high strangeness events occur. My point is that scientists do not have any metaphysical or logical reasons for dismissing serious studies of the high strangeness aspect. My argument goes like this:

1. If reports and testimonies of high strangeness experiences are numerous and credible, then science should, at a minimum, have the attitude that these experiences might represent something real and scientifically significant.

2. There are numerous and credible reports and testimonies of high strangeness experiences.

3. Therefore, science has no justified reasons to not seriously study high strangeness experiences.

(The argument is appealing to scientific integrity, humility, curiosity, and courage). Of course, logical conclusions are easy to reject or refute. Empirical evidence, not as easy. In my opinion, there is compelling empirical evidence of the high strangeness aspect. However, a review or an assessment of the evidence is outside the purpose and scope of this article.

Instead, let me summarize my thoughts on the relevance of metaphysics to the study of high strangeness events and/or the UFO phenomenon (-na). The summary begins on a general level and after that, you will find a bullet list of the three most important points in the previous sections and how they relate to the study of high strangeness experiences and UFOs.

First, metaphysics applied to the study of high strangeness or UFOs/UAP can be either constructive or destructive. Yes, it is the same old “it dependence”; nonetheless, it is true. If you only sit and ponder metaphysical issues, as interesting as that may be, you will never reach any definitive answers about anything in the world. You will be constantly confused, and in the worst case, it can be detrimental to your mental health. So be careful, and remember, “everything in moderation”. So that is an example of a destructive way to use metaphysics.

How constructively apply metaphysics? Well, if you have read the previous sections (especially section 2 and its subsections), you may have noticed that you made associations, came up with ideas, and so on while reading about supervenience, dualism, qualia, etc. That, I think, is a useful way for us laypersons in philosophy to approach metaphysical questions and paradoxes. Reading literature on metaphysics or listening to some professional philosopher explain a metaphysical issue and converse with peers, can generate fresh perspectives and new ideas about the high strangeness aspect and/or the UFO phenomenon (-na).

Obviously, the ideal is to combine the theoretical and abstract with the practical and concrete. I am a so-called armchair commentator, but I am well aware that I will not reach any definitive answers about the high strangeness aspect or UFOs/UAP without some practical fieldwork. So even though I can question the results or conclusions of researchers out in the field gathering data, analyzing, etc., I will always appreciate and highly respect their dedication and effort.

Now, and before we round off this blog post, let me summarize what I think were the most relevant points in the previous sections and how they can be useful when pondering high strangeness experiences.

• The interpretation question: what does it mean to say everything is physical? Recall that the interpretation questions ask two distinct questions which one is: what is the condition, being physical, that everything satisfies or bears a relation to? I believe the latter question is an example of something we take for granted to know and understand. “Of course, everyone knows what a physical object is or what is not a physical object!” That may be easy to determine on a macro-level. But the closer we get to the quantum world, the less obvious the distinction between the physical and the non-physical. In my mind, this uncertainty about where to draw the distinction between the physical and non-physical leaves open the possibility for “matter” to differ fundamentally or essentially from our current understanding. The interpretation question also legitimizes the decades-old and still lively debated question of the nature of UFOs/UAP. Are they physical, non-physical, both, or something else? Here you can also include whether all high strangeness events, paranormal phenomena, and UFOs are connected or represent distinct or wholly separate sources.

• Remember the other question entailed in the interpretation question: what relation or relations obtain between everything and the physical, if physicalism is true. Physicalism (physics) characterizes its fundamental entities (quarks, protons, electrons, etc.) relationally, in terms of their causal and other relations to other entities. But physicalism is silent about what all this causation relates. What is the thing that is doing the causing? A physicist would likely find my questions and their implications dubious. Nevertheless, I believe they are reasonable. Why? Again, this uncertainty about causation is reason to question whether the physical (matter) determines the non-physical (consciousness) or if it is the other way around? As mentioned in one of the subsections of section 2., high strangeness experiences are per se not inconsistent with physicalism. The issue is rather that physicalism is silent about the fundamental nature of reality and, therefore, cannot, yet, tell the whole story about what might or must be the case.

• The knowledge argument. Frank Jackson´s argument is closely related to the interpretation question. Recall that the nub of Jackson´s argument is that “one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have.” That is, I can have all the physical information to know everything about you but still not know what it is like being you. What does that have to do with high strangeness experiences and/or the UFO phenomenon? Well, for one, the knowledge argument might generate new ideas about the intentionality of whatever or whoever is behind high strangeness experiences. What I am about to say is neither new nor my idea, but it is worth mentioning for our purposes. The concept of information is likely a central factor in most cases of high strangeness. So you can start by asking, what is information? Is it as fundamental as energy? What is information for? How does information relate to consciousness? Is it possible to obtain phenomenal information (what it is like being you/human being)? How? And so on. The point with the questions is to show that we started with a metaphysical question that eventually leads to more practical questions. And during our pondering of those questions, we may start to think about what kind of information “The Phenomeon” (for lack of a better word) is after (if any) and why? Or what kind of information (if any) is encoded or transmitted in high strangeness events and experiences, and why?

We have reached the end of this article. I hope you have a better idea of what metaphysics as a branch of philosophy can be and how it can potentially be used in your studies of high strangeness experiences and UFOs and in your life in general. If not, then the fault is probably mine.

Some of the giants on whose shoulders we are standing realized the relevance of metaphysics to the high strangeness aspect of the UFO phenomenon. I have already mentioned one of the giants, J. Allen Hynek. Another of the giants is Jacques Vallée (who is, fortunately, still with us). If you are interested in their metaphysical discussions, I highly recommend their book The Edge Of Reality: A progress report on Unidentified Flying Objects (1975), see especially chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5.

Lastly, I am certain that the various high strangeness events and experiences demonstrate that humanity still has a lot to learn about reality’s fundamental or essential nature.

Some of the physical UFOs/UAP have already demonstrated gaps in our understanding of reality. Therefore, the threshold for science to study the high strangeness aspect is probably much lower than science realizes. At least, there are no metaphysical reasons for not climbing over the threshold.

Source: https://jannetikkanen140.medium.com/high-strangeness-and-metaphysics-f34b5627c3f8